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Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract       
 
The  purpose  of  the  present  paper  is  to  assess  the  competitive  behaviour  of 
Portuguese banking groups during the period ranging from 1991 to 2004, using 
the non-structural test developed by Panzar and Rosse. 
 
The  main  findings  are  that  the  Portuguese  banking  system  has  experienced 
weak competition between 1991 and 1996, underwent a period of restructuring 
until  2000,  and  from  then  until  2004  behaved  consistently  with  perfect 
competition. Both private and, more markedly, domestic banks, seem to have 
competed  more  aggressively  on  occasions,  and  no  relationship  between 
competitive behaviour and bank size was identified. 
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* The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those 
of the Banco de Portugal. 1. 1. 1. 1.  Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction       
 
 
Over the last two decades the Portuguese financial system went through major 
changes  in  the  competitive  environment  in  which  financial  intermediaries 
operate. The first liberalisation steps were taken in the mid 1980’s with the 
opening of domestic markets to private initiative, against the background of an 
almost fully nationalised banking system. Until the early 1990’s, banks remained 
tightly regulated in many dimensions of their activity. For instance, both prices 
and quantities in deposit and loan markets were administratively set or severely 
constrained,  while  great  discretion  remained  in  authorities’  hands  in  what 
concerns banks’ entry (both domestic and foreign) and branching decisions
1. In 
this setting, the lack of competitive forces in the 1980’s resulted directly from 
regulatory interference instead of stemming from market players’ conduct. In 
fact, only in the early 1990’s banks started to carry out their business in a full 
market environment, i.e. interest rate setting was free in all operations, while 
credit ceilings, a system of credit quotas defined at the bank level that was in 
effect during the 1980’s, were abolished. In this way, we defined a priori the 
post-1990 period as the focus of our analysis of competitive conditions prevailing 
in the Portuguese banking market. This involved the identification of time series 
patterns  in  competition  and  the  direct  test  of  regime  shift  associated  to 
participation in the euro area. 
 
The evolution of concentration in the Portuguese banking industry according to 
the  3  and  5-bank  concentration  indices  (C3  and  C5,  respectively,  on  the  left 
scale)  and  to  the  Herfindahl-Hirshman  Index  (HHI,  on  the  right  scale),  all 
derived from banks’ total assets, is displayed in Graph 1.
2 The three presented 
indicators show that concentration has increased over time as the deregulation 
period was followed by a consolidation trend across the market. From Graph 1, 
                                       
1 See Ribeiro (2007) for a brief overview of the liberalisation process. 















=∑ , where si is 
the market share of bank i. Also note that the unit of observation is the economic banking 
group, rather than the banking legal entity. For more details on this point, refer to Section 4.   2 
it is observable that over the period comprised between 1991 and 2004 there 
were two main consolidation waves. Until 1996, as the privatization program 
progressed,  concentration  increased  almost  linearly.  Afterwards  it  remained 
relatively stable even though deep changes in the shareholding structure and 
control in some of the largest banks were observed in 2000. 























































Another relevant development to the national banking sector during the period 
under scrutiny was the event of privatizations and the increase in the weight of 
foreign banks, as the market was liberalized. In fact, if there were ten public 
banking groups operating in 1991, by 1996 there was only one — Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos. Consequently, the market share of public banks in total assets has 
decreased from close to 60% in 1991 to around 20% since 1996. On the other 
hand, the number of foreign banks has increased from 1991 to 2004 and so has 
their market share, which was around 5% in 1991 and slightly over 20% in 2004. 
The recorded increase in the market share of foreign banks was greater than 
that  observed  in  the  number  of  active  foreign  banks.  This  reflects  a  major 
acquisition  carried  on  by  a  foreign  bank  during  the  above  mentioned 
consolidation wave in 2000. In fact, similarly to most other European markets, 
de novo organic growth by foreign players in the Portuguese market was not 
particularly successful in the retail business.   3 
 
According  to  the  traditional  structure-conduct-performance  paradigm  (Bain 
(1951)),  an  increase  in  concentration  should  be  linked  to  a  decrease  in 
competition.  However,  this  result  contradicts  common  wisdom  and  anecdotal 
evidence regarding the behaviour of the Portuguese banking sector during the 
period under analysis. This fact, which could be explained both by Baumol’s 
contestability theory (Baumol (1982)) and by the efficiency hypothesis posted 
by Demestz (1974), motivates the use of the non-structural test described below. 
 
The approach taken to assess the degree of competition consists on specifying 
tests based on empirical reduced form revenue equations, as stated originally in 
Panzar and Rosse (1987). Revenues are explained by a vector of input prices 
and  the  sum  of  the  corresponding  elasticities  is  a  statistic,  the  so-called  H-
statistic,  with  useful  properties  in  the  inference  of  competitive  behaviour. 
However,  the  use  of  this  statistic  is  not  immune  to  criticism  based  on  the 
assumptions underlying its use as a measure of competition in banking markets. 
Hence, the Panzar-Rosse methodology is a non-structural approach, as opposed 
to  estimable  specifications  rooted  on  static  oligopoly  models,  which  establish 
testable  relationships  between  market  structure,  direct  measures  of  strategic 
behaviour  and  competition.  Further,  this  methodology  carries  the  crucial 
hypothesis that banks are essentially producers of a single product in the credit 
market, while all funding sources, including deposits, are considered inputs in 
banks’ production function. Another controversial issue across most empirical 
studies is the definition of the appropriate variable to represent banks’ revenue: 
either interest income or total income used in levels or scaled by total assets. 
These issues as well as the possible ways of overcoming them in the empirical 
specification  are  discussed  in  detail  in  this  paper.  Particular  attention  is 
dedicated to the definition of the interest revenue variable in order to restrict 
the  analysis  to  the domestic  loan  market,  the  most  liable  to  exhibit  market 
power in the investment side of banks’ balance sheet. Similarly, the definition of 
the cost of funding variable takes due care of the different role of each bank as a 
provider of immediacy or payment services, in order to control for systematic   4 
differences in the presence of banks in those segments of funding markets where 
market power is more prone to emerge. Average funding cost is also adjusted to 
account for the presence of a bank in the interbank market both as a creditor 
and debtor.  
 
Despite  the  shortcomings,  the  simplicity  of  this  methodology  explains  its 
popularity in the study of competition in banking markets. For instance, it does 
not require price and quantity data on the services provided by banks, an issue 
that can often be problematic in the estimation of empirical structural equations 
of banks’ behaviour, either because they are not available to researchers or due 
to the fluidity of these services in what concerns establishing a measure of their 
quantity. Another appealing property of this methodology is the fact that it 
allows for the inference of the interaction between input price shocks to the cost 
function and the revenue function, without requiring the estimation of output 
demand  or  cost  functions.  In  addition,  there  is  no  need  to  worry  about  the 
appropriate relevant market in a geographic sense, as the input price to revenue 
relationship captures possible local market product differentiation on average, in 
the aggregate. 
 
In the next section, the relationship between some common competition models 
and the results of the Panzar and Rosse (P-R) approach are derived. Section 3 
presents a brief summary of previous empirical findings on the subject, whereas 
Section 4 presents the data and empirical methodology employed and results are 
shown in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. 2. 2. 2.  The Panzar The Panzar The Panzar The Panzar- - - -Rosse approach Rosse approach Rosse approach Rosse approach       
       
2.1. 2.1. 2.1. 2.1.         Competitive long Competitive long Competitive long Competitive long- - - -run equilibrium run equilibrium run equilibrium run equilibrium       
       
       
To start with, let us establish the main positive result derived in Panzar-Rosse 
(1987),  concerning  the  magnitude  of  the  H-statistic  in  long-run  perfect 
competition  equilibrium.  From  duality  theory  and  under  some  regularity   5 
conditions, for some arbitrary production function  1 ( ,..., ) M y f x x = where  i x are 
M inputs, there is a function  ( , ) C y w , the cost function, which results from the 








=∑ for each given output level 
y.  
In long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium, price should equal marginal cost 
and  free  entry  and  exit  conditions  determine  zero  economic  profit.  For  our 
purposes it translates into the two following expressions: 
(1)   0 0 ( , ) 0 - = w
C C
y p C y  
(2)   0 0 0 ( , ) 0 - = w
C C C p y C y  
where the superscript C stands for perfectly competitive equilibrium price and 
output levels.  
Comparative statics in the neighbourhood of the competitive equilibrium can be 
undertaken taking the total differential of (1) and (2) and applying Cramer’s 
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By Shephard’s Lemma, the partial derivative of the cost function with respect 
to each input price is the conditional demand for the input itself, i.e.  =
i w i C x  
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Taking  C R as the total receipt  C C p y in the competitive equilibrium and using 
equality (2), in equilibrium, its derivative with respect to each factor price is 
(4) 
  ¶













Taking  (4),  multiplying  by  factor  prices,  aggregating  and  dividing  by  total 
receipt, the resulting figure is the so-called H-statistic, i.e. the sum of factor 
price elasticities of total revenue such as   6 
(5)   
( )   - ¶ ¶
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Using the definitions of the cost and marginal cost functions and its equilibrium 
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It is straightforward from (2) to see that the first term vanishes and the second 
term is equal to 1.  
 
The mechanics of what’s in place in this problem can be explained as follows. 
Multiplying  all  factor  prices  by  the  same  arbitrary  proportion  h,  as  cost 
functions  are  homogeneous  of  degree  1  in  factor  prices,  we  know  that 
0 0 ( , ) ( , ) = w w
C C C y h hC y  and  0 0 ( , ) ( , ) = w w
C C
y y C y h hC y . Multiplying (1) by h it is 
straightforward to see that  1 0
C C p hp =  and  1 0
C C y y =  are solutions of the problem, 
with  1 0 w hw = . Similarly, from homogeneity of degree 1 of the cost function the 
vector  { } 1 1 ,
C C p y  that solves condition (1), satisfies also condition (2), so that 
1
1 1 0 ,0
C
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In looser terms, it means that each bank is facing a perfectly elastic demand 
schedule which is tangent to the average cost curve at its minimum. Given the 
homogeneity of degree one in factor prices of both the marginal and average 
cost functions they shift in the same proportion as a simultaneous shock to all 
factor prices. The same happens to prices, while each firm’s market equilibrium 
quantity remains unaffected. In this way, shifts in factor prices transmit fully to 
total revenue. This is a powerful result allowing for the implementation of a 
direct test of market players’ behaviour consistent with price taking behaviour 
and in which no bank is earning abnormal profits. 
   7 
2.2. 2.2. 2.2. 2.2.         Monopolistic  behaviour  in  markets  for  imperfect  Monopolistic  behaviour  in  markets  for  imperfect  Monopolistic  behaviour  in  markets  for  imperfect  Monopolistic  behaviour  in  markets  for  imperfect 
substitutes substitutes substitutes substitutes       
 
Models of monopolistic behaviour are the most plausible to consider a priori in 
banking as, even if we consider banks as producers of a single product very 
homogeneous  in  its  intrinsic  characteristics,  banks  differentiate  among  each 
other  by  means  of  brand  advertising  and/or  branch  location.  The  resulting 
framework  is  one  in  which  banks  differentiate  in  quality  and  are  profit 
maximisers  over  their  own  specific  perceived  demand.  For  the  purpose  of 
studying the H-statistic’s properties we will consider both the case of a market 
with  a  pre-fixed  number  of  banks,  which  is  conceptually  similar  to  perfect 
monopoly behaviour in each bank’s captive demand, and the case of free entry 
and exit à la Chamberlin. In the monopoly case, market players can sustain 
supra-normal profits, because they do not face the threat of entry, at least in 
the short-run. In the latter case, market conditions attract to or drive banks 
away  from  the  market,  so  that  in  the  long-run  equilibrium  economic  rents 
cannot be extracted. 
   8 
2.2.1. 2.2.1. 2.2.1. 2.2.1. Monopoly,  perfect  cartel  or  Monopoly,  perfect  cartel  or  Monopoly,  perfect  cartel  or  Monopoly,  perfect  cartel  or  short short short short- - - -run  run  run  run  monopolistic  monopolistic  monopolistic  monopolistic 
competition competition competition competition equilibrium  equilibrium  equilibrium  equilibrium       
       
For simplicity, we consider a market equally shared by a fixed number of banks, 
in such a way that we can concentrate on some arbitrary representative bank. 
When choosing its output level, the representative bank ignores the effect that 
changes of competitors’ output have on the industry prevailing price in such a 
way that each bank can be considered a monopolist in its particular product 
variety,  local  market  or  any  other  characteristic  mapping  each  bank  to  a 
different brand from the consumer perspective. In addition, we consider that a 
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Where  the  first  condition  consists  on  assuming  a  standard  negatively  sloped 
demand curve, the second condition is a way of stating analytically that the 
market each bank faces shrinks with the number of competitors and the last 
condition, where g  stands for the symmetric of demand elasticity, implies that 
each bank’s perceived demand “flattens” with the number of banks. In this class 
of models, perceived demand elasticity can be mapped into the Lerner index, i.e. 
the relative price to marginal cost spread, which is a measure of market power. 
 
In such a setting, the representative bank chooses the output level 
M y  which 
solves implicitly the first order condition  
(8)  ( , ) ( , )
M M
y y R y n C y = w  
Differentiating  (8)  relatively  to  i w ,  applying  Shephard’s  Lemma  and 
rearranging terms yields 
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3 The following setting borrows directly from Vesala (1995).   9 
Differentiating the revenue function in the neighbourhood of equilibrium output 
with respect to  i w yields: 
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The H-statistic is obtained by multiplying (10) by  i w and aggregating over the 
set of inputs: 
(11) 
( )
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This  expression  is  clearly  non-positive  as 
2 2 y p ¶ ¶ is  negative  by  the  second 
order  condition  of  profit  maximization  and  (.) g   is  higher  than  one  in  
equilibrium  for  a  profit  maximising  monopolist.  Hence,  a  negative  (or  null) 
value of the H-statistic is consistent with a monopoly (n=1), a perfect cartel 
that replicates monopoly market outcomes and markets with a predetermined 
number of banks behaving monopolistically. Another interesting result is that H 
is strictly decreasing with respect to the symmetric of the perceived demand 
elasticity, i.e. higher (less negative) values of H can be interpreted as higher 
effective market power exercised by the monopolist. 
 
2.2.2. 2.2.2. 2.2.2. 2.2.2. Long Long Long Long- - - -run  run  run  run  (Chamberlinean)  (Chamberlinean)  (Chamberlinean)  (Chamberlinean)  monopolistic  competition monopolistic  competition monopolistic  competition monopolistic  competition       
equilibrium equilibrium equilibrium equilibrium       
 
Considering the number of banks as endogenous and no longer predetermined as 
in the previous section, the long-run equilibrium is attained when no incentives 
prevail to bank entry. Positive rents attract new banks to the market shifting 
the representative bank’s demand schedule up to the point where each bank is 
operating at its economic profit break-even point
4. Analytically it implies that in 
addition to the representative bank’s first order condition stating that marginal 
                                       
4  This  concept  of  long-run  equilibrium  is  usually  labelled  “Chamberlinian  equilibrium”  and 
borrows directly from Chamberlin (1933).   10 
revenues  equate  marginal  costs  as  in  (8),  a  zero-profit  condition  has  to  be 
imposed, such as: 
(12) 
* * * ( , ) ( , ) 0 R y n C y - = w , where 
* n is the long-run equilibrium number of 
symmetric banks. 
 
Totally  differentiating  both  conditions  with  respect  to  factor  prices  and  the 







, multiplying by factor prices and aggregating 
over all factors yields: 
(13) 
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Rewriting the numerator in terms of the inverse demand function it becomes: 
(14)  ( ) ( )
2 3 * * *
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simplifies to 
(15)  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
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The second term is clearly positive, given the assumptions in (7). Further, all 
else constant, the H-statistic is increasing in the perceived demand elasticity 
and converges to 1 as it approaches infinity, replicating the perfect competition 
outcome derived above. 
 
It should be borne in mind, however, that this concept of equilibrium is built up 
on assumptions of individual firm profit maximisation, taking all other firms’ 
actions as constant. This assumption implies no strategic interaction of market 
players, arguably a too naïve description of market players’ behaviour in an 
oligopoly  (for  e.g.,  see  Kreps  (1990)  for  a  particularly  sanguine  sceptical 
discussion of this model).  
   11 
Anyway, the non-acceptance of both the null hypothesis of  0 H £  and  1 H =  
has  been  interpreted  in  previous  empirical  applications  as  resulting  from  a 
market  environment  which  is  not  consistent  with  either  long-run  perfectly 
competitive  equilibrium  or  perfect  tacit  collusive  behaviour.  Instead,  it  must 
contain  elements  that  are  akin  to  both  monopoly  and  perfect  competition, 
representing some intermediate position, as it is the case in the monopolistic 
competition equilibrium (see, e.g., Henderson et al. (1980), page 193).  
3. 3. 3. 3.  Previous empirical findings Previous empirical findings Previous empirical findings Previous empirical findings       
 
Most  studies  applying  the  Panzar  and  Rosse  methodology  reject  both  the 
hypothesis  of  monopoly  (or  perfect  cartel)  behaviour  and  that  of  perfect 
competition. In a cross-country analysis for the EU-15 for the period between 
1997  and  2003,  Casu  and  Girardone  (2006)  find  a  value  for  the  H-statistic 
between zero and one, thus rejecting both monopoly and perfect competition, at 
EU-15  level,  as  well  as  for  most  countries  individually,  including  Portugal.
5 
Koutsomanoli-Fillipaki  and  Staikouras  (2004)  also  reject  both  monopoly  and 
perfect competition, for a period ranging from 1998 to 2002. However, in this 
study, rather than being estimated individually for Portugal, the H-statistic is 
estimated for the EU-15 as a whole. Bikker et al. (2006) present a cross-country 
study  where  competitive  conditions  are  estimated  for  101  countries  between 
1986 and 2005. Since this paper intends to make a methodological point, several 
different  specifications  are  estimated,  and  the  results  obtained  for  Portugal 
range from monopoly, in their preferred specifications, to perfect competition in 
the models they consider misspecified.
6 In general, available results for Portugal 
are similar to those found for other countries. For a more complete summary of 
results obtained in recent applications of the Panzar and Rosse methodology, 
refer to Table 1 in Casu and Girardone (2006) and to Table 1 in Bikker et al. 
(2006). 
                                       
5 Perfect competition was not rejected for Finland and monopoly was not rejected for Greece. 
However, the authors note that inference for these two countries was based on a small number 
of observations. 
6 See the next Section for a discussion on their methodological point.   12 
              
4. 4. 4. 4.  Data and empirical methodology Data and empirical methodology Data and empirical methodology Data and empirical methodology       
 
The dataset used in this study was obtained from banks’ financial statements 
reported to Banco de Portugal. The database comprises an unbalanced panel of 
yearly data for all active banks operating in Portugal from 1991 to 2004. Since 
detailed  consolidated  accounting  data  is  available  only  for  the  most  recent 
period, data on individual basis was used instead. However, since interest lies in 
comparing the behaviour of different economic units rather than legal entities, 
data for banks belonging to the same economic group were aggregated into one 
decision making unit. 
 
All banks operating in Portugal are required to report financial statements to 
Banco de Portugal. However, there is a large number of small banks that mostly 
operate in investment banking and are thus likely to behave differently from 
most  commercial  or  universal  banks.  Hence,  in  order  to  obtain  a  sample  of 
reasonably homogenous banks, observations for institutions with less than 15 
branches or 15 employees were eliminated. Banks that do not take any deposits 
from customers were also eliminated, and it was checked that positive values for 
total assets and equity were reported for all observations in the sample. The 
first  two  years  of  activity  of  new  banks  were  also  eliminated,  as  it  seems 
reasonable  to  assume  that  during  early  stages  banks  may  behave  differently 
than  once  their  activity  is  stabilized.  25  banking  groups  and  a  total  of  197 
observations survived this process. For each year, the final sample includes no 
less than 92% of loans granted to customers, 94% of customer deposits held and 
92% of total assets of the Portuguese banking system. All money variables were 
deflated using the GDP deflator. 
 
The definition of banks’ outputs and inputs is by no means simple. On the one 
hand,  the  “production  approach”  to  bank  modelling  regards  banks  as  firms 
producing  services  which  are  related  to  loans  and  deposit  accounts,  thus 
measuring output by the number of deposit accounts serviced and the number   13 
of loans originated and input by labour and physical capital. On the other hand, 
according to the “intermediation approach” (Sealey and Lindley (1977)), banks’ 
main activity is granting loans and investing in securities and other assets using 
funds  obtained  through  deposits,  purchased  funds  and  equity.
7  Hence,  while 
both approaches agree in classifying labour and physical capital as inputs, they 
present  a  conflicting  view  as  to  whether  deposits  should  be  classified  as  an 
output or as an input. Since economic theory does not give clear guidance as to 
which modelling approach best describes the behaviour of the banking firm, it is 
somewhat  reassuring  to  note  that  estimated  cost  functions  appear  relatively 
insensitive  to  which  approach  is  followed  (Humphrey  (1990)).  On  the  other 
hand,  there  is  empirical  evidence  suggesting  that  deposits  overall  behave 
primarily as inputs (examples are Gilligan and Smirlock (1984), Hughes and 
Mester  (1993),  Shaffer  (1994)  and  Hughes,  Mester  and  Moon  (2000)).  The 
Panzar and Rosse methodology used in this study follows the intermediation 
approach. Hence banks are modelled as firms that use labour, physical capital 
and funds in order to produce loans. 
 
There  has  been  considerable  debate  in  the  literature  as  to  whether  the 
dependent variable used to estimate empirical P-R equations should consider 
total or only interest revenue. On the one hand, the fact that the P-R method 
considers loans as banks’ main output, suggests interest revenue should be used. 
On the other hand, the increase in the relative importance of commissions and 
fees  in  banks’  total  revenue  should  not  be  neglected.  Hence,  in  the  baseline 
specification, we choose to use interest revenue as the dependent variable and 
include  the  ratio  of  other  income  to  interest  income  as  a  regressor,  thus 
accounting for changes in income structure. Nonetheless, in order to check for 
the sensitivity of results, models where the dependent variable includes both 
interest and commission and fee income were also estimated.
8 
                                       
7 See Freixas and Rochet (1998), pp. 77-79, on the production and intermediation approach. 
8 The choice to include the ratio of other revenue to interest revenue is particularly interesting 
since  ln ln( ) ln ( / ) TR IR OR IR OR IR = + » + , as put forward in Bikker et al. (2006). Note, 
however, that OR/IR may not be exogenous in the regression, and so we do not test whether its   14 
 
A third matter of discussion is whether banks’ size should be controlled for. 
Since it seems overly simplistic to assume banks’ size is uncorrelated with input 
prices,  it  is  likely  that  the  exclusion  of  a  scaling  variable  could  bias  the 
estimates for the elasticities of factor prices. On the other hand, Bikker et al. 
(2006) point out that the use of a scaling variable (either as a regressor or by 
defining the dependent variable as the ratio of revenue to total assets rather 
than the absolute value of revenue) effectively turns the revenue equation into a 
price equation, and the sum of the elasticities of the output’s price with respect 
to  input  prices  is  positive  by  definition,  and  independent  of  the  industry’s 
degree  of  competition.  Hence,  including  a  scaling  factor  in  the  estimated 
equation  could  introduce  a  positive  bias  the  estimate  of  H.  The  possible 
presence of “errors-in-variables” due to the approximation of input prices should, 
however,  act  in  the  opposite  direction,  as  it  should  bias  the  estimated 
coefficients downwards, whether a scaling factor is used or not. 
 
The  baseline  specification  for  the  empirical  reduced  form  revenue  equation 




                                                                                                              
coefficient equals minus one (in which case the regression would be equivalent to one where the 
dependent variable is total inccome) or zero (in which case the regression would in turn be 
equivalent  to  one  where  the  dependent  variable  is  interest  income  and  other  income  is  not 
controlled  for).  Nonetheless,  estimation  results  where  OR/IR  is  not  considered  and  the 
dependent  variable  is  either  total  income  (see  Table  3)  or  interest  income  (not  shown  but 
available upon request) have yielded similar estimates for the H-statistic to those obtained with 
the baseline specification. 
9 The use of the loglinear form is widespread among studies applying the P-R methodology, as it 
typically improves the regression’s goodness of fit and may reduce simultaneity bias (De Bandt 
and Davies 2000). Furthermore, Molyneux et al. (1996) found that a loglinear revenue equation 
yielded similar results as a more flexible translog equation.   15 
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= ∑ , d  is a constant term,  i h  is 
an unobservable variable that captures idiosyncratic features of each institution 
that are constant over time and  it e  is a random shock.  
 
The  dependent  variable  used  in  the  baseline  specification  —  ln  IR  —  is  the 
natural logarithm of interest revenue obtained from loans granted to domestic 
clients. The option to focus the analysis only on the portion of interest revenue 
earned on loans rather than including all interest income is explained by the 
fact that banks are known to have little market power on the remaining interest 
earning  business,  such  as  interbank  and  securities  activities.  As  such,  the 
analytical  interest  lies  on  testing  how  competitive  banks  are  in  customer 
lending. Hence, a broader specification of the dependent variable would very 
likely overestimate the competitive conditions in the banking system. This is a 
novelty  feature  of  this  study  worth  emphasising  as,  to  our  knowledge,  all 
previous studies apply this methodology to all interest revenues. 
 
The average price of labour — wL — is proxied by the ratio of labour costs to the 
number  of  employees,  whereas  the  ratio  of  (tangible  and  intangible)  capital 
expenditure to (tangible and intangible) fixed assets — wK — proxies the cost of 
capital and the ratio of interest paid to interest bearing debt — wF — measures 
banks’ average funding cost. 
 
The ratio of customer demand deposits to total deposits (DDEP/TDEP) and 
that of market to total liabilities (ML/TL) are included to account for banks’ 
funding mix, whereas the ratio of short term loans to total loans (STL/TL) and 
of interbank assets to customer loans (IBA/CL), on the other hand, intend to 
capture the effect of the credit mix. The increasing importance of banks’ off   16 
balance  sheet  activity  is  controlled  for  by  the  inclusion  of  the  ratio  of  off 
balance sheet activity to total assets (OBS/A) as a regressor. The ratio of assets 
to branches (A/B) intends to capture different branching strategies, measuring 
systematic differences in banks’ branch density. 
 
The share of customer loans that have defaulted during each year — NPL1/CL — 
is a credit risk measure that attempts to capture the flow rather than the stock 
of non performing loans, thus decreasing the ex-post character of this variable. 
In turn, the ratio of equity to assets (E/A) should proxy banks’ risk aversion 
once credit risk is controlled for.  
 
The ratio of other revenue — commission and fee income — to interest revenue 
(OR/IR),  as  discussed  above,  intends  to  capture  the  increasing  role  of  non 
interest revenue in banks’ income. The inclusion of asset quartile dummies in 
the  equation  is  a  compromise  solution  that  intends  to  address  the 
misspecification  described  in  Bikker  et  al.  (2006),  while  at  the  same  time 
controlling at least partially for the correlation between banks’ size and input 
prices.
10 Finally, M, F and P are dummy variables equal to one, respectively, 
when a merger has occurred, if a bank is foreign or if it is public.
11 
 
Descriptive statistics of the included variables are presented in Table 1 below 
and the correlation matrix is in Table A4 in the Appendix.  
                                       
10 For the sample used in estimation, the simple correlation coefficient between ln A and input 
prices is 0.35 for the price of labour, -0.08 for the price of capital and -0.24 for the price of 
funds. 
11 Only domestic public banks are classified as public, since public banks operating abroad are 
likely to exhibit similar behaviour to that of local private banks. Tables A1 and A2 in the 
Appendix display which banks are classified as public and as foreign, respectively, for each year.   17 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
IR 197 307.6 340.0 2.5 1445.6
TR 197 348.7 385.0 2.5 1702.3
IR/A 197 4.2 2.0 0.4 10.6
TR/A 197 4.7 2.0 0.8 10.9
W L (thousnands of euros) 197 21.2 3.9 7.4 31.9
W K 197 13.3 5.6 4.0 41.9
W F 197 6.9 4.5 1.1 27.6
DDEP/TDEP 197 35.6 9.5 18.7 65.2
ML/TL 197 44.1 14.6 13.4 88.7
STL/TL 197 46.7 20.8 9.3 93.8
IBA/CL 197 45.2 36.5 0.3 169.7
OBS/A 197 190.1 2365.9 3.4 33228.2
A/B 197 27.3 10.9 4.4 58.7
NPL1/CL 197 1.5 1.3 0.0 7.6
E/A 197 6.9 2.7 1.5 29.8
OR/IR 197 14.6 12.8 1.0 105.6
ROA 197 4.9 5.7 -47.4 25.8
A 197 9295.6 11447.3 70.5 45172.8
NOTE: Money variables are valued in millions of 1991 Euros (unless otherwise stated) and ratios are defined in percentage form. 
 
Equation [16] was first estimated for the whole sample, including domestic and 
foreign as well as private and state owned banks for the period ranging from 
1991 to 2004. However, as discussed in Section 1, this time period is by no 
means homogenous, since during the early to mid 90’s the Portuguese banking 
system  underwent  a  phase  of  privatizations,  consolidation  and  liberalization. 
Hence, we perform a sequential test for differences in the H-statistic through 
time by first estimating an equation using data for the first four years in the 
sample and checking whether the estimate for the fourth year is statistically 
different  from  that  obtained  for  the  initial  period  comprising  the  first  three 
years. If so, a new period starting on the fourth year would be created; if not 
1994 would be pooled with 1991-1993. This process was repeated until 2004, 
restricting  each  period  to  comprise  at  least  three  years  of  data.  Due  to  the 
limited sample size, cross section equations for each year were not estimated.
12 
 
In order to test for differences in the competitive behaviour of different types of 
banks, equations considering only domestic banks and only private banks were 
estimated. Even though it would be more informative to allow the estimate of 
the  degree  of  competition  to  vary  across  types  of  banks,  this  option  is  not 
                                       
12 In fact, De Bandt and Davies (2000) advocate the importance of the time series component as 
they find variable results for cross section equations even with information for a larger number 
of banks.   18 
feasible due to the small number of public and foreign banks in the sample. 
Hence,  the  statistical  significance  of  the  difference  in  competitive  behaviour 
observed across types of banks is not tested. 
 
As several authors have pointed out (examples are Bikker and Haaf (2002) and 
Hempel (2002)), small banks may have more market power in local markets, 
whereas larger banks are generally believed to face greater competition. Note 
that  this  argument  may  not  apply  directly  to  Portugal,  considering  the 
relatively small size of the national market and the fact that most regions tend 
to be served by at least one large bank. Nevertheless, the only truly effective 
way of addressing the misspecification pointed out in Bikker et al. (2006) while 
avoiding the introduction of other sources of bias is to analyse the competitive 
behaviour  of  similarly  sized  banks,  thus  avoiding  the  need  to  use  a  scaling 
variable. Hence, the same estimation procedure is applied to small and large 
banks  separately,  where  small  and  large  is  defined  according  to  whether  a 
bank’s total assets are above or below average total assets for each year.
13 We 
divide the sample in only two groups in order to minimize the loss of degrees of 
freedom,  and  the  average  is  chosen  over  the  median  as,  due  to  the  high 
concentration in the Portuguese banking market, the group of the 50% largest 
institutions is very heterogeneous in terms of size. Once again, the small sample 
size  introduces  limitations  in  that  it  renders  unfeasible  the  estimation  of 
different  measures  of  competition  through  time  when  the  sample  is  divided 
between small and large banks. 
 
The interpretation of the outcome of the P-R approach depends on whether or 
not banks are in a state of long run equilibrium. In fact, while the result that 
the  sum  of  factor  price  elasticities  of  a  monopolist’s  reduced  form  revenue 
function must be nonpositive holds even in the short run, results for models of 
perfect and monopolistic competition depend on the assumption that the firms 
are  observed  in  long-run  equilibrium  (see  Panzar  and  Rosse  (1987)).  As  is 
common  practice  in  studies  applying  the  Panzar  and  Rosse  methodology 
                                       
13 Table A3 in the appendix shows which banks are classified as large for each year.   19 
(examples of which are Shaffer (1982) and Molyneux et al. (1994)), we use the 
fact that in equilibrium risk-adjusted rates of return should be equalised across 
banks.  Thus,  banks’  Return  On  Assets  (ROA)  should  be  uncorrelated  with 
input prices  when  the  market  is  in  equilibrium.  A direct  test  of  equilibrium 
consists on estimating the P-R equation with ROA as the dependent variable 
and performing a test for 0 H =  (equilibrium) against  0 H <  (disequilibrium), 
where H is the sum of factor price elasticities with respect to the profitability 
measures. 
 
To test for the robustness of the results, some alternative specifications were 
estimated,  including  the  use  of  total  rather  than  interest  income  as  the 
dependent variable and using alternative scaling variables, such as the natural 
logarithm of total assets, scaling income by total assets and not controlling at 
all for size differences. 
 
In order to account for the existence of non measurable bank specific factors 
that  are  invariant  through  time,  the  fixed-effects  estimator  was  used,  thus 
allowing  for  possible  correlation  between  the  individual  effect  and  the 
explanatory variables. 
 
5. 5. 5. 5.  Results Results Results Results       
 
Table 2 presents fixed-effects estimation results for equation (16), as well as for 
the  auxiliary  regression  used  to  perform  the  long  run  equilibrium  test.  The 
estimate of the elasticity of interest income with respect to each of the three 
inputs considered proves to be positive. In fact, the estimate of the H-statistic, 
laying  at  0.691,  changes  only  marginally  when  non  significant  variables  are 
eliminated from the regression.
14 The test for monopoly performed is a one sided 
test for  0 : 0 H H £  versus  1 : 0 H H > , and the null hypothesis is clearly rejected 
in favour of the alternative under both specifications, thus providing compelling 
                                       
14  Results  of  this  more  parsimonious  regression  are  not  reported  but  are  available  from  the 
authors upon request.   20 
evidence  against  the  hypothesis  that  the  Portuguese  banking  industry  has 
operated  as  a  monopoly  or  as  a  perfect  cartel  on  average  during  the  period 
under scrutiny.
15 If, on the other hand, banks were under perfect competition, 
the H-statistic should equal one. A two sided test for this hypothesis is thus 
performed and, as shown in Table 2, the corresponding p-value is close to 10%, 
so that it is not clear whether perfect competition should be rejected or not. 
Another relevant result reported in Table 2 is that the hypothesis that the sum 
of  the  elasticities  of  profitability  (measured  by  ROA)  with  respect  to  factor 
prices equals zero can not be rejected, which, as argued in the previous section, 
gives support to the statement that the system was in long run equilibrium 
during the relevant period.  Hence, one may conclude that, on average, in the 
period ranging from 1991 to 2004, the behaviour of Portuguese banks cannot be 
assessed as consistent with alternative forms of monopoly-like conduct (such as 
perfect cartel or monopolistic competition in a market without the threat of 
entry), and it is not clear whether it is consistent with perfectly competitive 
behaviour, or whether it is best described as stemming from an intermediate 
model such as that of long-run free-entry monopolistic competition. 
 
                                       
15 As remarked in Bikker et al. (2006), even though a large number of studies applying the 
Panzar  and  Rosse  methodology  have  used  a  two  sided  test,  thus  specifying  the  alternative 
hypothesis as 0 H ¹ , this is incorrect, as under monopoly the H-statistic may assume negative 
values.   21 
Table 2. Estimation Results
0.284 0.155 -0.692 1.795
0.230 0.076 -0.492 0.818
0.177 0.105 3.188 1.911
-0.794 0.709 3.837 6.506
-0.631 0.582 -5.729 6.097
-1.025 0.307 6.617 3.675
-0.460 0.099 -3.852 1.199
0.004 0.001 -0.015 0.014
0.022 0.006 0.147 0.070
1.580 2.328 -193.520 82.798
-8.103 2.616 39.284 14.485
-1.730 0.416 8.455 6.059
-1.352 0.206 -0.671 1.797
-1.107 0.186 -0.935 1.520
-0.271 0.108 -0.542 0.966
0.022 0.064 0.119 0.683
0.491 0.172 4.839 2.482
-0.821 0.162 -3.424 1.841








NOTES: 1) The coefficient on this variable and the corresponding standard error are multiplied by 1000.



































The  control  variables  regarding  the  funding  mix  have  not  shown  to  be 
significant,  whereas  the  negative  sign  on  the  variable  which  measures  the 
maturity structure of granted loans suggests that banks for which the weight of 
short  term  loans  is  more  important  tend  to  earn  less  revenue,  which  is 
consistent with the fact that credit risk adjusted spreads tend to be lower on 
short than on long term loans. The same reasoning, i.e. differences in spreads, 
may be used for the interpretation of the result that banks with a higher ratio 
of interbank assets to customer loans tend to earn lower interest revenue from 
customer loans, whereas it seems natural that banks which are more active in 
the interbank and securities market relatively to the customer loan market, for 
a given value of total assets, earn less revenue from the latter business. Banks   22 
with  more  off  balance  sheet  activity  seem  to  earn  higher  interest  revenues, 
which may be explained by the possibility that this variable is capturing the 
effect that banks with more off balance sheet activity tend to have a riskier 
profile. Banks with relatively less, and possibly larger branches tend to earn 
higher interest income, whereas the measures of credit risk and of risk aversion 
have the expected signs, even if the former is not statistically significant. As 
expected, the coefficient on the variable which controls for the ratio of other 
revenue  to  total  revenue  yields  a  negative  sign.  Moreover,  the  estimated 
coefficients  for  the  dummy  variables  identifying  the  quartile  of  the  asset 
distribution to which each bank belongs indicate that, all else constant, smaller 
banks tend to earn less revenue. As to what concerns the remaining control 
variables, mergers do not seem to have a significant impact on interest revenue 
earned  whereas,  ceteris  paribus,  foreign  banks  seem  to  earn  more  interest 
revenue, while the opposite result is found for public banks. 
       
Table  3  shows  a  series  of  robustness  tests  in  the  form  of  alternative 
specifications  to  Model  [1]  which  illustrate  the  impact  in  results  of  different 
choices regarding the dependent variable and the scaling variables used.  
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For each cell, the value in the centre is that of the H-statistic, whereas p-
values for the test H≤0 (left) and H=1 (right) are presented below.
***, ** and * indicate evidence of disequilibrium at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
confidence level, respectively.  
   23 
As  to  what  concerns  different  definitions  of  the  dependent  variable, 
specifications where (the natural logarithm of) total rather than interest income 
is chosen as the dependent variable are presented. From comparison of the first 
two and of the last two lines in Table 3, one finds that considering total rather 
than interest revenue has virtually no impact, either in the point estimate for 
H-statistic or in the tests conducted upon it. 
 
Another relevant robustness test involves checking the sensitivity of results to 
different scaling variables. From the results presented in Table 3 one finds that, 
as expected, specifying the dependent variable as the ratio of revenues to assets 
yields virtually the same results as specifications where the natural logarithm of 
assets is included as a regressor.
16 If, instead, one controls for the size difference 
of banks through the use of asset quartile dummies, the estimate for the H-
statistic  decreases  slightly  when  interest  income  is  used  as  the  dependent 
variable. A more relevant change is the fact that, as reported in Bikker (2006), 
standard deviations are compressed in “price equations”, which might lead to 
reject perfect competition too often, even if a point estimate that is closer to one 
is obtained. As shown in the last column of Table 3 above, specifications where 
no scaling variable is used yield a somewhat lower estimate for the H-statistic, 
whereas  results  for  hypothesis  tests  remain  unchanged  relatively  to 
specifications where total assets are considered. 
 
Hence, considering a series of alternative specifications, it remains quite clear 
that, from 1991 to 2004, the Portuguese banking sector has not operated under 
monopoly.  However  there  is  now  greater  evidence  towards  the  rejection  of 
perfectly  competitive  behaviour  as  well,  and  so  the  hypothesis  of  an 
intermediate situation, such as that of monopolistic competition, seems more 
appropriate. 
 
As briefly discussed in the first section of this study, the Portuguese banking 
system underwent significant changes during the sample period. Hence in order 
                                       
16 This was expected since ln( / ) ln( ) ln( ) X Y X Y = - .   24 
to investigate whether the process of liberalization and consolidation has had an 
impact in competitive conditions, the estimated H-statistic is allowed to vary 
over  time  without  any  particular  functional  form  being  imposed  upon  it, 
through the method described in the previous section. Aggregation tests to find 
homogenous periods were conducted on the specification presented in Model [1]. 
As  a  result,  three  periods  were  obtained:  a  first  period  of  consolidation  and 
adjustment to less restrictive regulations — 1991 to 1996; a second period of 
post-consolidation  adjustment,  which  includes  the  beginning  of  euro  area 
participation — 1997 to 2000; and a final period of relative maturity, ending in 
2004. Table 4 presents results for fixed-effects estimates of the H-statistic for 
the three periods, as well as for the whole sample, using as scaling variables the 
natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  (line  1)  and  dummy  variables  for  asset 
quartiles (line 2) as well as using no scaling variable (line 3). 
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Table 4. Evolution of H for all banks
Scaling 
variable

















For each cell, the value in the centre is that of the H-statistic, whereas p-values for 
the tests H≤0 (left), H=1 (right) and H t=H t+1 (between periods) are presented 
below.






During the first period, perfect competition is rejected in all specifications and 
monopoly is rejected only when the natural logarithm of total assets is used as a 
scaling variable. For the other specifications, which according to Bikker et al. 
(2006) should be more reliable, the monopoly hypothesis is not rejected and the 
estimate  of  the  H-statistic  is  either  negative  or  close  to  zero.  Furthermore, 
during this first period of intense consolidation and privatization, there is no 
evidence  to  reject  the  hypothesis  that  the  Portuguese  banking  system  was   25 
operating in equilibrium. Hence, one concludes that the degree of competition 
was relatively low during this period. As to what concerns the next period, even 
if conclusions for the hypothesis tests on the H-statistic are the same, there is 
evidence that the system was not operating under long-run equilibrium. Hence, 
estimated coefficients constitute no evidence of collusive behaviour, since while 
the rejection of monopoly in the first specification remains valid in this context, 
non-rejection of  0 H £ under disequilibrium no longer implies the industry has 
behaved jointly as a monopoly. In the most recent period, while there is strong 
evidence  to  reject  perfect  monopoly  (as  well  as  perfect  cartel  or  short  run 
monopolistic  behaviour  without  threat  of  entry)  in  all  specifications,  perfect 
competition  is  no  longer  rejected  under  any  of  the  three  specifications. 
Furthermore,  differences  in  the  estimate  of  the  H-statistic  between  the 
intermediate and the most recent period are, both in the magnitude and in the 
statistical  significance  of  the  estimated  coefficients,  more  striking  than  those 
found between the first and the second period. 
 
Since  foreign  banks  are  likely  to  behave  differently  form  domestic  banks,  a 
replication of the above results while restricting the sample to domestic banks is 
presented  in  Table 5.  An  increase  in  the  estimated  value  of  the  H-statistic 
across most periods and specifications is observed.
17 In fact, even if conclusions 
regarding the first period remain unchanged, perfect competition is only rejected 
for domestic banks between 1997 and 2000 when the natural logarithm of total 
assets is included in the regression, which suggests domestic banks have behaved 
more  competitively  than  the  banking  system  as  a  whole  during  this  period. 
Obtained  results  for  the  period  between  2001  and  2004  when  the  natural 
logarithm  of  total  assets  is  not  considered  explicitly  are  consistent  with  the 
hypothesis that domestic banks might have behaved too competitively in this 
period, which may be rationalized under a more complex, dynamic model, where 
banks aggressively fight for increased market share in order to capitalize on it 
                                       
17 Exceptions are the estimates for the H-statistic for the first and the last period when the 
natural  logarithm  of  total  assets  is  used  as  a  scaling  variable,  which  are  slightly  lower  for 
domestic than for all banks.   26 
with  high  profits  in  the  future.
18  Furthermore,  there  is  no  evidence  that 
domestic banks have not operated under long run equilibrium in the eve of the 
EMU.  Restricting  the  estimate  for  the  degree  of  competition  exerted  by 
domestic banks to be constant from 1991 to 2004, if one once again concentrates 
on specifications where the natural logarithm of total assets is not explicitly 
considered, higher values for the H-statistic are obtained when the sample is 
restricted  to  domestic  banks,  and  there  is  no  evidence  to  reject  perfect 
competition.  As  can  be  seen  by  comparison  of  tables  4  and  5,  when  the 
logarithm  of  assets  is  included  as  a  scaling  variable,  results  for  the  relevant 
hypothesis tests do not change even though the point estimate for H decreases. 
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Table 5. Evolution of H for domestic banks (FE)
Scaling 
variable
1991-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 1991-2004
 
 
Table 6 shows the result of similar estimations ran on a sample which includes 
only private banks. Since the number of public banks in the sample is relatively 
small, it is not surprising to find that results are quite close to those obtained 
for  all  banks.  Nevertheless,  the  degree  of  competition  as  inferred  by  the  H-
statistic is slightly higher for private banks between 1991 and 1997 as well as 
when the full 1991-2004 period is considered, in which case there is also less 
compelling evidence towards the rejection of the perfect competition hypothesis 
when only private banks are considered.  
 
                                       
18 This sort of strategic behaviour may stem from the presence of switching or search costs.   27 
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Table 6. Evolution of H for private banks (FE)
Scaling 
variable
1991-1996 1997-2000 2001-2004 1991-2004
 
 
As to what concerns the comparison of the H-statistic between small and large 
banks, no robust difference was found. In fact, in addition to results not being 
robust  to  slight  changes  in  banks’  classification,  equality  of  the  estimates 
obtained for each group is not statistically rejected. Hence, during the period 
under analysis, there is no evidence that small banks have been able to exert 
higher  market  power  due  to  a  stronger  presence  in  local  markets  where 
competition is less aggressive. The fact that this hypothesis, which has been 
widely stated and tested for other countries, does not apply to Portugal, should 
be linked to the smaller size of the national market as compared to those for 
which  the  relevant  result  has  been  obtained,  since  in  larger  countries  it  is 
common to find banks which have a strong position in the region where they 
operate, despite having little weight in the national market as a whole. This fact 
mitigates the existence of fully distinct local markets in the Portuguese case. 
 
6. 6. 6. 6.  Conclu Conclu Conclu Conclusions sions sions sions       
       
The  main  conclusion  to  retain  from  this  study  is  that  on  average,  over  the 
period  from  1991  to  2004,  Portuguese  banks  do  not  seem  to  have  operated 
either  under  perfect  competition  or  under  perfect  monopoly,  but  rather 
consistently with long-run monopolistic competition. During this period, both 
private  and  domestic  banks  seem  to  have  competed  more  aggressively  on   28 
average than the banking system as a whole, and perfect competition may not 
be rejected for these two types of banks. 
 
An  investigation  of  changes  in  competitive  behaviour  throughout  the  period 
suggests  that  competition  was  relatively  weak  between  1991  and  1996,  even 
though results suggest domestic and especially private banks exhibited slightly 
higher competitive behaviour. An adjustment period followed between 1997 and 
2000, in which behaviour consistent with long run equilibrium is rejected both 
for the banking system as a whole and for the group of private banks, whereas 
for  domestic  banks  the  hypothesis  of  behaviour  consistent  with  perfectly 
competitive  long  run  equilibrium  is  not  rejected.  In  the  more  recent  period, 
ranging from 2001 to 2004, strong competition was observed, and it is possible 
that  domestic  banks  have  competed  more  aggressively  than  expected  in  the 
framework of a static model with no distortions. Hence, the results suggest that 
the  deregulation  and  liberalization  process  experienced  by  the  Portuguese 
banking  sector,  including  euro  area  participation,  catalysed  an  increase  in 
competition, particularly in what concerns the credit market. 
 
One  should,  nonetheless,  bear  in  mind  the  limitations  of  the  non-structural 
approach employed, particularly regarding the hypotheses implicitly imposed on 
the underlying model for banks’ behaviour. Therefore, obtained results should 
be  compared  with  those  derived  using  alternative  methods  in  order  to  draw 
more  general  conclusions  on  the  degree  of  competition  in  the  Portuguese 
banking sector.   29 
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BCA BCA BCA BCA BCA CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD
BFB BCM BFE BFE BFE
BFE BFE BPSM BPSM CGD





7/17 8/19 4/15 4/14 3/15 1/15 1/14 1/14 1/14 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12 1/12
NOTES:  BPSM was not considered in 1991 due to the unavailability of profit and loss account data.
All foreign banks are classified as private.
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1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BARCLAYSBARCLAYSBARCLAYSBARCLAYSBARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS BARCLAYS
BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA BBVA
CLP CLP CLP CLP CLP CLP CLP SANTANDER SANTANDER SANTANDER SANTANDER SANTANDER BNC BNC
SANTANDER SANTANDER SANTANDER SANTANDER SANTANDER
3/17 3/19 3/15 3/14 4/15 4/15 4/14 3/14 3/14 3/12 3/12 3/12 3/12 3/12
Table A2. Foreign banking groups  34 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP BCP
BFE BFE BFE BPA BPSM BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI BPI
BPA BPA BPA BTA CGD BPSM BPSM BPSM BPSM CGD CGD CGD CGD CGD
BTA BPI BTA CGD GES CGD CGD CGD CGD GES GES GES GES GES




6/17 8/19 6/15 5/14 4/15 5/15 5/14 5/14 5/14 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12 5/12
NOTES: BPSM was not considered in 1991 due to the unavailability of profit and loss account data.
Large banks are defined as those with total assets exceeding average total assets for each year. The remaining banks are classified as small.
Table A3. Large banking groups  35 
Table A4. Correlation matrix
ln IR ln TR ln (IR/A) ln (TR/A) ln W L ln W K ln W F DDEP/TDEP ML/TL STL/TL IBA/CL OBS/A A/B NPL1/CL E/A OR/IR ROE ROA ln A
ln IR 1
ln TR 1.00 1
ln (IR/A) 0.05 -0.01 1
ln (TR/A) 0.02 -0.03 0.99 1
ln W L 0.22 0.26 -0.37 -0.34 1
ln W K -0.04 -0.05 0.10 0.10 0.17 1
ln W F 0.00 -0.04 0.67 0.66 -0.21 0.04 1
DDEP/TDEP -0.33 -0.28 -0.49 -0.43 0.41 0.12 -0.33 1
ML/TL -0.06 -0.02 -0.71 -0.69 0.53 0.03 -0.39 0.58 1
STL/TL -0.38 -0.38 0.05 0.08 0.02 -0.06 0.50 0.30 0.22 1
IBA/CL 0.07 0.08 -0.43 -0.47 0.27 -0.01 0.14 0.05 0.39 0.25 1
OBS/A -0.14 -0.11 -0.14 -0.07 0.06 -0.12 -0.03 0.23 0.09 0.11 0.05 1
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ROA 0.33 0.32 0.23 0.23 -0.10 -0.02 0.15 -0.18 -0.15 -0.11 -0.19 -0.02 0.12 0.00 0.20 -0.15 0.91 1
ln A 0.93 0.95 -0.31 -0.34 0.35 -0.08 -0.24 -0.13 0.20 -0.38 0.22 -0.08 0.64 -0.22 -0.33 0.07 0.24 0.23 1  WORKING PAPERS
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